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1 Introduction
Investment management is a sizable and important sector of the U.S. economy that is driven in
large part by the assessment of risks.1 As such, there exists extensive research (academic literature
as well as practical methodologies) devoted to determining the characteristics of mutual (or hedge)
funds associated with delivering superior returns. Diversication of securities, for the purpose of
lowering the overall price variance (risk) of a portfolio, has been a core nance principle since
Markowitz (1952). Thus, the ability of fund management teams to make decisions that generate
abnormal positive returns and/or reduce risk is a salient issue for academics and practitioners alike.
Normative models of economic and investment behavior usually identify a single objective func-
tion that implicitly treats all decisions as individual ones (Shupp & Williams, 2008). However, it
has been well documented that group psychology often leads people to make dierent decisions
when they operate as part of a group than when they act as individuals (Shefrin, 2007; Kerr et al.,
1996). While there are many funds that are managed by a single fund manager, the majority of
larger funds are managed by teams.2 Thus, understanding the implications of team composition
for portfolio management decisions has important consequences for this major industry.
Several recent studies have demonstrated that groups do make decisions that are signicantly
dierent from individuals when faced with identical information about uncertain outcomes. Shupp
and Williams (2008) show that the variance of risk preferences is generally smaller for groups than
individuals. They also nd that the average group is more risk averse than the average individual in
high-risk situations but groups tend to be less risk averse in low-risk situations. Baker et al. (2008)
show that in lottery-choice experiments, groups tend to make decisions that are more consistent
with risk-neutral preferences in the lowest and highest risk lotteries. Yet, Masclet et al. (2009)
1In 2008, the U.S. mutual fund market managed assets worth almost $9 trillion. Source: January 2009 - The
Cerulli Edge Global Edition (Published by Cerulli Associates a nancial research rm)
2A random sample in 2009 of 50 large cap and mid cap mutual funds shows that: i) The average size of a large cap
fund management team is three people with a maximum of nine managers and a minimum of one manager. ii) The
average size of a mid cap fund management team is two people with a maximum of ve managers and a minimum of
one manager. Source: www.morningstar.com
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nd that groups are more likely than individuals to choose safe lotteries. Sutter (2007) nds that
team decision making attenuates myopic loss aversion but that teams still are prone to myopic loss
aversion. Adams and Ferreira (2010) also provide evidence to support the hypothesis that group
decisions are more moderate than individual decisions. Rockenbach et al. (2007) nd that teams
take `better' risks. They show that compared to individuals, teams accumulate signicantly more
expected value at a signicantly lower total risk.
Cox and Hayne (2006) nd not only that there are systematic dierences between group and
individual decisions but also that the group decisions are aected by the dening characteristics
of the group. They nd that groups having individuals with distinct information make dierent
decisions than groups with common information. While there are many types of team characteristics
that could be salient, we expand on this literature by exploring the question of whether gender
diversity in investment management group composition inuences decision making behavior.
To our knowledge, an open question remains in the nancial economics literature as to whether
team gender diversity leads to any measurable dierences with respect to portfolio choice decisions.
It previously has been shown that individually females are more risk averse than males (Jianako-
plos & Bernasek, 1998). However, since teams have been shown to make dierent decisions than
individuals, it is not clear that team risk seeking (or loss aversion) is monotonically increasing with
the number of male team members.
We test our hypotheses using an experimental economics approach. As with previous economics
literature in this area, we focus on team decisions involving identical information with uncertain
outcomes (Baker et al., 2008; Shupp & Williams, 2008; Adams & Ferreira, 2010) and loss aversion
(Sutter, 2007). Specically, we focus on how portfolio choice is aected by risk aversion and loss
aversion. We nd that a male presence increases team risk seeking and increases team loss aversion.
Interestingly, we nd that the homogeneous teams (be they all female OR all male) are neither the
most risk seeking nor the most loss averse. This suggests that team gender composition inuences
a team's process for evaluating risk and loss.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses individual and team
decision making theory. Section 3 describes the experimental study. Section 4 discusses the data.
Section 5 presents econometric analysis and results. Section 6 summarizes key ndings and provides
concluding remarks.
2 Individual and Team Decision Making Theory
Various aspects of group diversity in a variety of dierent contexts have been studied in the eco-
nomics and management literature. Within the management literature, numerous disparate and
conicting theories have been developed with respect to group diversity and group performance
(Williams and O'Reilly (1998); Cummings (2004); Hamilton et al. (2004); Apesteguia et al. (2011)).
The nascent economics literature analyzing when and how group decisions dier from individual
decisions in economic contexts has focused primarily on lottery choice decisions in experimental
settings. (See for example, Baker et al., 2008; Shupp & Williams, 2008; Rockenbach et al., 2007;
Masclet et al., 2009; Sutter, 2007.) Additionally, Dufwenberg and Muren (2006) show that gender
composition aects the generosity of teams in the context of a dictator game and Ambrus et al.
(2009) nd evidence of gender eects in gift-exchange games. However, the eect of group diversity
on investment decisions in general and within fund management teams in particular is a much less
explored eld of study.
The empirical literature focused specically on group composition and fund management is
limited and inconsistent at best. Prather and Middleton (2000) nd that there is no appreciable
dierence between the outcomes of team-managed and individually-managed mutual funds. Cheva-
lier and Ellison (1999) demonstrate that mutual fund managers from more competitive undergrad-
uate institutions have systematically higher risk-adjusted excess returns. Analyzing a sample of
management teams from the U.S. mutual fund industry, Bar et al. (2007) conclude that gender
diversity is negatively related to fund performance while informational diversity is positively re-
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lated to fund performance. More specically, teams composed of heterogeneous industry tenure and
education backgrounds outperform teams with a more homogeneous composition. Bar et al. (2007)
also conclude that age diversity has no impact on returns and that single-gender teams outperform
mixed-gender teams.
Atkinson et al. (2003) compare xed-income mutual funds and nd that male- and female-
managed funds do not dier signicantly in terms of performance, risk, or other fund characteristics.
Their results suggest that dierences in investment behavior often attributed to gender may be
related to investment knowledge and wealth constraints. Niessen and Ruenzi (2007, 2009) nd that
female and male mutual fund managers do not dier in average performance but female managers
do receive signicantly lower inows. They also show that although average performance does
not dier between male and female managers, male managers achieve more extreme performance
outcomes and show less performance persistence.
Behavioral economics evidence suggests that males and females possess diering strengths and
weaknesses with respect to the requisite skills for investment management (Croson & Gneezy, 2009).
Barber and Odean (2001) nd that with respect to trading strategies, men are more overcondent
than women; trading stock as much as 45 percent more than women. Being overcondent, men make
more trades that result in lower returns once transaction costs are incorporated. Fehr-Duda et al.
(2006) conclude that women's probability weighting functions (used to weigh uncertain outputs in
gambles) are strongly susceptible to mood states while men's are not. Kumar (2010) nds that
female equity analysts issue bolder and more accurate forecasts and that stock market participants
react to this male-female skill dierence. Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) show that women are
more risk averse with respect to nancial decisions. Powell and Ansic (1997) demonstrate that males
and females adopt dierent strategies in nancial decision environments but that these strategies
have no signicant impact on ability to perform. Consequently, in our study we focus on how
dierences in team gender composition aect investment decisions. Specically, we focus on two
key factors that have been previously shown to inuence investment decisions: risk aversion and
loss aversion.
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Using experimental data, we seek to answer the following question: \Do gender diverse portfolio
(mutual fund) management teams make dierent decisions than homogeneous teams with respect
to risk aversion and loss aversion?" From Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) one could infer that
female dominated fund management teams would be more risk averse than male dominated teams.
However, since teams have been shown to make dierent decisions than individuals, it is not clear
that risk seeking would be increasing with male team member representation. From Sutter (2007)
we know that teams also are prone to myopic loss aversion but the gender composition eect of the
teams was not analyzed.
3 Experimental Study
Given the conicting empirical evidence and the limited power of the empirical tests due to the
small relative numbers of females in most samples of fund management teams, we use an experi-
mental approach which has been used by many to study the eects of risk attitudes on individual
portfolio choice (See for example, Charness and Gneezy (2010)). There are several benets to an
experimental approach over the traditional approach prevalent in the extant literature. First, con-
trolled laboratory experiments provide the benet of eliminating the numerous complicating factors
of the real world while maintaining enough realism in its use of human subjects to test theories
empirically. Second, even if the data in the real world are straight-forward enough to facilitate em-
pirical study, the empirical dierences within the data may be insucient to grant enough power
to make hypothesis tests signicant. For instance, Chevalier and Ellison (1999) state that their
sample was only 7 percent female managers, thus preventing them from making conclusions on how
signicant of a role gender plays in mutual fund returns. Conversely, in the laboratory, we can
construct mutual fund management groups such that stronger conclusions can be drawn. Third,
by choosing mutual funds as the vehicle through which we examine the role of team diversity, our
results are easily standardized and compared to real world investment decisions.
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3.1 Experimental Procedure
In an experimental economics laboratory, subjects were randomly placed in teams of four persons
each.3 Teams were created such that there were several teams in each of ve categories. Each team
contained exactly: 1) Four Males; 2) Three Males; 3) Two Males; 4) One Male; or 5) Zero Males.
To be consistent with our real-world context, we do not explicitly prime subjects on gender before
the experiment. Subjects interact face-to-face in their teams and thus can observe the team gender
composition. While explicit gender priming has the advantage of potentially generating stronger
experimental eects, the benet of subtle gender priming is that we can more easily justify the
generalizability of the results.
Our experiment was designed to replicate an actual investment selection setting so that our
results could be easily related to real-world investment management decisions. The decisions were
simple versions of actual investment portfolio management decisions. Each team was given the task
of making six completely separate decisions. To avoid company and/or industry related framing
eects, there were two decisions for companies in each of three industries: health care sector,
industrials sector, and materials sector. For each decision, the team could select one of two options
(Choice A or Choice B). Three of the decisions were buy decisions in which the team was required
to choose between two investing options (high risk option, low risk option) for an equity portfolio.
Three of the decisions were sell decisions in which the team was required to choose between selling
two securities (selling one stock for a bigger loss while keeping the stock with the higher future
return; selling one stock for a smaller loss while keeping the stock with the lower future return) in
an equity portfolio. The order of each specic decision was randomized across teams. An example
of both a buy decision and a sell decision follows.4
3Typically, the experimental literature involving group decisions uses three-person groups. (See for example,
Baker et al., 2008; Shupp & Williams, 2008; Sutter, 2007; Rockenbach et al., 2007; Masclet et al., 2009.) We utilize
four-person groups so that we can observe the decisions of teams with a balanced number of males and females.
4While there is little consensus on the nature of the 'willingness to pay' (WTP) and 'willingness to accept' (WTA)
situation gap (Coursey, Hovis, & Schulze, 1987; Plott & Zeiler, 2005), our comparisons are within each type of
situation not across WTP-WTA situations.
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Buy Decision Example
This mutual fund [mutual fund description provided to subjects and available upon request] just
received a cash infusion of $1 million. Your team is responsible for making a $1 million equity
purchase for this fund. You must invest all $1 million in one of two stocks. You cannot divide
the $1 million investment between the two choices. Your investment choices are:
Choice A: 20,284 shares of Healthgen, Inc. Choice A has a 0.5 probability of earning 15% by
January 1, 2010 and a 0.5 probability of earning 0% by January 1, 2010.
Choice B: 29,665 shares of PharmInc. Choice B has a 0.5 probability of earning 8% by
January 1, 2010 and a 0.5 probability of earning 7% by January 1, 2010.
Sell Decision Example5
This mutual fund [mutual fund description provided to subjects and available upon request] needs
$1 million in cash. Your team is responsible for selling $1 million worth of stock from this fund.
You must sell $1 million worth of one of two stocks. You cannot divide the $1 million sold
between the two choices. (If you sell a stock for a loss, the portfolio will realize the loss in 2009.)
Your choices of stock to sell are:
Choice A: 22,758 shares of Carson Laboratories (originally purchased at $49.05/share). By
selling Carson stock, you will incur a certain loss of 10%. In keeping Smith stock you will
have a 0.5 probability of earning 20% and a 0.5 probability of earning 0%.
Choice B: 42,301 shares of Smith Pharmaceuticals (originally purchased at $25.55/share).
By selling Smith stock, you will incur a certain loss of 5%. In keeping Carson stock you
will have a 0.5 probability of earning 6% and a 0.5 probability of earning 4%.
There were ve dierent treatments of the experimental design. The treatments dier by
whether or not the two choices have the same expected value and by the amount of stock choice
information provided. A summary of the dierent treatments is presented in Table 1.
Another advantage of our experimental approach is that diverse prior knowledge of subjects
(information diversity a la Bar et al. (2007) and Cummings (2004)) is unlikely to inuence the
results. Nonetheless, we further control for the various types of available stock information. Within
our experiment, all teams in every treatment were given information on each fund (stated fund
strategy, sector, fund size, historical performance etc.). However, the specic information on the
investment options varied by treatment.6 The information treatments varied across teams not
5The sell decisions were created to be consistent with our real-world context. Each sell decision was constructed
in such a way that within each choice (A or B) the magnitude of the expected value of the gain from the stock
retained was always equivalent to the magnitude of the loss realized by selling the other stock.
6Information on investment options was based upon historical information from actual companies. Company
names were changed to avoid any framing eects. Additionally, future returns for each investment option were
extrapolated to eliminate the opportunity for experimental subjects to \game" the experiment by trying to guess
the true identity of each company to gain an advantage for selection. Specic examples of the company information
provided are available upon request.
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Table 1: Experimental Treatments: Expected Value and Stock Choice
Information
Both Stock Choices Have Probability of Detailed Information
Treatments Same Expected Value Returns Information on Stock Choices
1 { No Yes
2 Yes Yes Yes
3 No Yes Yes
4 Yes Yes No
5 No Yes No
within teams. These treatments were designed to control for information eects that could inuence
the results.
In one treatment, teams were given detailed information on the investment options (P/E ratios,
historical average returns, etc.) and no probability of returns information on each stock choice. In a
second treatment, teams were given detailed information on the investment options and probability
of returns information for each stock choice in which the two stock choices had the same expected
value. In a third treatment teams were given detailed information on the investment options and
probability of returns information for each stock choice in which the two stock choices did not have
the same expected value. A fourth treatment provided no detailed investment option information
but did provide probability of returns information on the stock choices in which the choices had the
same expected value. The fth treatment provided no detailed investment option information but
did provide probability of returns information on the stock choices in which the choices did not have
the same expected value. With regard to the information treatments, for the full sample analysis
all data were pooled and we controlled for information treatment type in the econometric analysis.
We also analyzed subsamples of specic treatments. While we will show that the dierences in
stock choice expected values did aect the results, we found no signicant information eects.
9
Teams were given an unlimited amount of time to make their decisions. Each team was told
that if, at any time, it could not reach a decision for one of the six portfolios, one of the team
members would be chosen at random to make that particular portfolio decision for the team.7
8 The time taken to reach each decision was recorded.9 All members of a team received the
same payment after every team member completed an exit survey. Team payments were based
upon the performance of one of the team's portfolio choices chosen at random from all of the
team's decisions in the experiment.10 The average payout was $15 per student. (For detailed
experiment instructions and payout determination procedure, see Appendix A.) We conducted the
experiment using 364 undergraduate student subjects that voluntarily registered to participate in
the experiment through a university experimental economics web site. All subjects were required
to complete both a preliminary survey and an exit survey.
3.2 Subject Pool
We conducted four rounds of the experiment using undergraduate business and economics students.
We drew from the population of undergraduate business and economics students to ensure that
any gender dierences were not associated with non-specialist populations. The population also
provided that subjects were familiar with nancial decisions. The investment decisions presented
were designed to mimic the types of exercises presented in business classroom exercises.
Haigh and List (2005) show that professionals display more loss aversion than students in an
experimental context. Further, von Gaudecker et al. (2012) show that sampling from a student
population leads to lower estimates of average risk aversion and loss aversion. Given our student
subject pool, this would suggests that any results and ndings would be a lower bound when
7No explicit instructions about how to reach a decision were provided. Subjects were asked about the team decision
process in an exit survey.
8It was not necessary for any team to make a decision in this manner during any round of the experiment.
9The average time for teams to complete all decisions was 23.18 minutes.
10This procedure has been well tested in experimental economics as a method of inducing good performance and
encouraging subjects to treat each decision as an independent decision. When subjects undertake a series of separate
decisions knowing that they will be paid for their performance from one randomly selected decision, they will treat
each decision as if it is the one for which they will be paid (Butler and Hey (1987); Hey (1991)).
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Table 2: Individual Risk and Loss Preference Summary Statistics
Males (%) Females (%)
Risk Averse 9.49 18.12
Risk Loving 1.46 1.34
Loss Averse 70.37 73.33
Loss Loving 2.92 5.33
considering the application or generalizability of our results to professional fund management team
settings.
4 Data
There were a total of 2,184 decision observations from the experiments made by 364 students within
91 teams. Individual subject risk and loss preferences obtained from the pre-experiment survey are
presented in Table 2.11 12 Consistent with Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) and Croson and
Gneezy (2009) in Table 2 we see that the individual females in the sample are more risk averse
than the individual males in the sample and the dierence is statistically signicant (p-value of
0.0000). Females also have a statistically signicant dierence in loss loving (p-value of 0.0124).
Table 2 also shows that males are more risk loving and less loss averse than females. However,
these dierences are not statistically signicant (p-values of 0.8360 and 0.1736 respectively).
11I. Subject is considered risk averse if he/she answers b to the following hypothetical question: Please circle which
of the following two situations (a or b) you would prefer. (a) A fair coin is ipped. If the coin comes up heads you
will be given $0. If the coin comes up tails, you will be given $120. (b) You are given $30.
II. Subject is considered risk loving if he/she answers a to the following hypothetical question: Please circle which of
the following two situations (a or b) you would prefer. (a) A fair coin is ipped. If the coin comes up heads you will
be given $0. If the coin comes up tails, you will be given $120. (b) You are given $90.
III. Subject is considered loss averse if he/she answers b to the following hypothetical question: Please circle which
of the following two situations (a or b) you would prefer. (a) You are given $120 and a fair coin is ipped. If the coin
comes up heads you will be asked to pay $0. If the coin comes up tails, you will be asked to pay $120. (b) A fair
coin is ipped. If the coin comes up heads you will be given $0. If the coin comes up tails, you will be given $120.
IV. Subject is considered loss loving if he/she answers a to the following question: Please circle which of the following
two hypothetical situations (a or b) you would prefer. (a) You are given $120 and a fair coin is ipped. If the coin
comes up heads you will be asked to pay $0. If the coin comes up tails, you will be asked to pay $120. (b) A fair
coin is ipped. If the coin comes up heads you will be given $0. If the coin comes up tails, you will be given $180.
12The pre-experiment survey was done immediately before the start of the experiment. Due to time and logistic
considerations we elicited individual risk and loss aversion with a context-free hypothetical survey instrument. How-
ever, Pennings and Smidts (2000) and Pennings and Garcia (2001) both demonstrate that individual risk attitude
lotteries are strong predictors of actual individual market behavior.
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Table 3: Subject Pool Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev.
Age 20.18 1.41
Percent Male 52.20 49.96
Percent African American 7.69 26.65
Percent Southeast/East Asian 34.07 47.40
Percent South Asian 5.77 23.32
Percent Hispanic 6.32 24.34
Percent Caucasian 44.51 49.71
Percent Other Race 0.02 0.13
Body Mass Index (BMI) 22.61 3.34
Semesters Completed 4.30 2.29
Percent Who Have Taken a Finance Class 36.54 48.16
Percent Holding a Leadership Position 91.21 28.32
The gender and ethnicity composition of our sample is contained in Table 3. The teams were
created to have sucient variation in gender composition (See Table 4). While we did collect
data on the ethnicity of each subject, there was insucient ethnic variation within our 364 student
sample to study the eects of team ethnic diversity on decisions. However, we control for both team
ethnic diversity and total number of risk averse (loss averse) individuals on each team.13 Table 5
summarizes team choice information for the three team decisions that were related to risk choices
and the three team decisions that were related to loss choices. Table 5 also shows the average
return earned by each team type. Notably, the two-male two-female teams earn the lowest average
team return.
13The average number of risk averse individuals on each team was 0.43 and the average number of loss averse
individuals on each team was 2.23.
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Table 4: Team Composition
Percent of Teams
All Males 21.98
Three Males 23.08
Two Males 14.29
One Male 21.98
No Males 18.68
One Ethnicity Represented 37.36
Two Ethnicities Represented 42.86
Three Ethnicities Represented 18.68
Four Ethnicities Represented 1.10
Table 5: Team Choices and Returns
Percent Selecting Percent Selecting Average Team
High Risk Choices Large Loss Choices Return (%)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
All Males 35.29 48.26 56.86 50.02 5.11 5.21
Three Males 38.33 49.03 58.33 49.72 3.99 4.18
Two Males 46.15 50.50 41.03 49.83 3.36 3.07
One Male 47.62 50.34 47.62 50.34 4.24 4.69
No Males 38.33 49.03 46.67 50.31 4.34 3.89
Observations 546
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5 Econometric Analysis and Results
To analyze the eect of team composition on the portfolio risk choices, we utilize probit models in
which the dependent variable is a binary variable that is given a value of 1 if the high risk stock
was selected and is given a value of 0 if the low risk stock was selected. Similarly, to evaluate the
eect of team composition on portfolio loss choices, we use a probit model in which the dependent
variable is a binary variable that is given a value of 1 if the large loss choice is selected and is given
a value of 0 if the smaller loss choice is selected. We perform the analysis both using a univariate
probit model and a random eects probit model for: a) the full sample, b) the treatments when
the two choices have the same expected value and c) the treatments when the two choices have
dierent expected values.
5.1 Univariate Probit Model
For the team level analysis, we control for team ethnic diversity, number of risk averse members on
the team, the number of loss averse members on the team, specic decision, decision order, industry
of stocks involved in decision, and treatment. The full model specication is:
TEAMCHOICEj = 0 +
KX
k=1
kTEAMGENDERCOMPjk +
LX
l=5
lXjl + j (1)
where Xjl is the set of team composition and experimental control variables. Standard errors are
clustered at the team level. (A detailed description of the variables used can be found in Appendix
B.)
Table 6 shows the results from equation 1. From Table 6, we generally nd that having a
male presence on the team increases the probability of selecting a higher risk investment. In
the full sample, teams with three males have the highest probability of selecting a higher risk
investment and this result is signicant at the 15% level. The treatments in which the probability
of returns for the two stock choices have the same expected value (Treatments 2 and 4) theoretically
should generate dierent results from the treatments in which the expected values are not the same
14
(Treatments 3 and 5); since the riskier choice in Treatments 2 and 4 represents added risk without
added expected return. Consequently, we also look separately at the results of the two types of
treatments: Treatments 2 and 4 - both choices have the same expected value (EV) and Treatments
3 and 5 - the choices do not have the same EV. The results from Treatments 2 and 4 are particularly
compelling. All risk averse individuals should prefer lower risk at the same expected value while
only more risk averse subjects will be willing to give up some expected value to achieve lower risk.
Yet, in this sample, having a three male team increases the probability of selecting the higher risk
investment and the result is signicant at the 5% level. Having one male on the team increases
the probability of selecting a higher risk investment and this result is weakly signicant at the 15%
level.
With regard to loss aversion, having a male presence on the team decreases the probability of
selecting the investment that will require the realization of a larger loss but has the potential for
a higher return. In the full sample, teams that have two males and two females have the lowest
probability of choosing the investment that will require the team to recognize a larger loss and this
result is signicant at the 10% level.
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5.2 Random Eects Probit Model
Both Bar et al. (2007) and Atkinson et al. (2003) suggest that knowledge and/or educational
dierences of fund managers inuence mutual fund performance. Additionally, Dwyer et al. (2002)
nd gender dierences in risk taking for mutual fund investors are attenuated once they control for
individual nancial investment knowledge. Since we drew from the population of undergraduate
business and economics students, our subject population is relatively homogeneous, familiar with
nancial decisions, and less likely to have any gender dierences associated with non-specialist
populations. However, in the random eects model specication, we can utilize the individual
subject data collected from both the preliminary survey and the exit survey to control for other
specic subject characteristics that could inuence the team investment decisions while controlling
for team level eects.
For our analysis, the random eects specication is preferable to a xed eects model by saving
on degrees of freedom. Moreover, since the collective inuence of any potential unmeasured variables
that give rise to the dierent intercepts is uncorrelated with the included explanatory variables,
there is no bias in the estimation.
The subject characteristic control variables include age, race, risk aversion disposition, loss
aversion disposition, semesters of college completed, and a dummy variable if the student has
taken a nance class. Since physical appearance has been shown to aect individual behavior
in trust experiments (Eckel & Petrie, 2011), we also control for physical attractiveness. For a
subsample of the data, we also have individual height and weight information. As a proxy for
physical attractiveness, we use a body mass index (BMI) measure (Tovee & Cornelissen, 2001;
Swami, 2005).14 15 Experimental controls for the team ethnic diversity, the specic decision, the
decision order, the industry of the stocks involved in the decision, and the treatment also are
14English BMI =
Weight in Pounds
(Height in Inches)2
x 703
15For a subsample of the data we also have information on leadership experience. Using this data, we create an
individual leadership dummy variable which we use to control for leadership experience. There is very little variation
in this variable. 91.2% of the sample held a leadership position. Thus, when we also include this variable in our
analysis, we nd consistent results.
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included.
The full model specication is:
CHOICEij = 0 +
X
kTEAMGENDERCOMPijk +
X
lXijl +
X
mZijm + uj + ij (2)
whereXijl is the set of team ethnic composition and experimental control variables and Zijm is the
set of subject characteristic control variables. (A detailed description of the variables used can be
found in Appendix B.)
Table 7 shows the full sample results from equation 2 with regard to the risk choices in the
rst three columns and loss choices in the last three columns. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered at the individual subject level. Consistent with Table 6, overall, having a male presence
on the team increases the probability of selecting the higher risk investment choice. However, the
eects are not increasing in the number of males on the team. Specically, having a team with
three men or a team with two men increases the probability of selecting the higher risk investment
choice by the greatest amount. The eects for the three male team dummy and the two male team
dummy are signicant across all versions of the specication. Notably, the all male teams are not
the most risk seeking. The teams with a majority male or a balanced gender composition are more
risk seeking than all male teams.
With regard to loss aversion, the two male team dummy variable decreases the probability of
selecting the investment that causes the team to recognize a larger loss and is signicant at the
1% level across all versions of the specication. In the specications with no subject characteristic
controls, the three male team dummy variable is negative and signicant at the 15% level.
For this analysis, we also look separately at the results of the two types of treatments (See
Table 8). Within these subsamples, we observe similar patterns to the ones in Table 7. Having a
male presence on the team increases the probability of selecting the higher risk investment. With
respect to the loss choice decisions, the two male team dummy variables decrease the probability
of selecting the investment that will require the realization of a larger loss.
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Table 7: Marginal Eects of Gender Composition on Investment Decisions - Random Eects
Probit Model, Full Sample
Dependent Variable
Risk Choice Loss Choice
All Male Team Dummy Variable 0.0931 0.1146 0.1165 -0.0310 -0.1137 -0.1106
(0.0572) (0.0875) (0.0874) (0.0555) (0.0826) (0.0837)
Three Male Team Dummy Variable 0.1806 0.2061 0.2064 -0.0940y -0.0361 -0.0352
(0.0542) (0.0744) (0.0742) (0.0578) (0.0731) (0.0732)
Two Male Team Dummy Variable 0.1431 0.2813 0.2820 -0.2334 -0.2027 -0.2022
(0.0696) (0.0791) (0.0792) (0.0511) (0.0741) (0.0741)
One Male Team Dummy Variable 0.0500 0.0993y 0.0992y -0.0144 0.0154 0.0145
(0.0570) (0.0622) (0.0622) (0.0606) (0.0666) (0.0662)
Student Characteristic Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Student Appearance Controls No No Yes No No Yes
Team Ethnic Diversity Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Experiment Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 1064 824 824 1036 793 793
Log Likelihood -599.53 -449.36 -449.32 -498.32 -400.55 -400.28
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the subject level. For the marginal eects, the derivative is evaluated at each observation
and the mean of these marginal eects is calculated and reported.
 Signicant at the 1% level.
 Signicant at the 5% level.
 Signicant at the 10% level.
y Signicant at the 15% level.
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5.3 Risk Adjusted Return Analysis
The raw data presented in Table 5 indicate dierences in returns by team gender composition. Con-
sequently, we also analyze the eect of team composition on team returns using an OLS regression
model in which the dependent variable is risk adjusted return. Risk adjusted return is dened as:
choice1 choice2
2
choice1
 2
choice2
.16 Both a team level analysis and an analysis in which we also control for subject
characteristics, do not indicate any economically meaningful relationships between team composi-
tion and risk adjusted returns. This is a striking result given the previous ndings regarding risk
taking behavior. In contrast to Rockenbach et al. (2007), we nd that the team types that accept
more risk do not systematically earn a higher risk adjusted return.
6 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
Given the economic importance of risk taking in nancial decision making, factors that inuence
risk analysis are key. Using an experimental economics approach, we nd that team composition
does inuence nancial decisions with regard to the assessment of risk and loss. A male presence
on a team can increase the probability of selecting a higher risk investment and can decrease the
probability of choosing an investment that will require realizing a larger loss. Our results are
complementary to other research by Castillo et al. (2012) who show that merely being in the same
room with males causes females to be more risk taking.
Since it has been well established that men individually exhibit more risk seeking behavior than
women, the fact that a male presence increases team risk seeking behavior is not surprising. What
is intriguing is that the risk seeking behavior of a team is not necessarily increasing with the number
of males on the team. All male teams, while more risk seeking than all female teams, are not the
most risk seeking. This non-monotonicity of risk seeking (and loss aversion) with respect to the
number of men on a team reinforces the premise that team decisions are dierent from individual
16Where  is the mean return of the choice and 2 is the standard deviation of the choice return.
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decisions. Better understanding the sources of these dierences, whether a mixed gender presence
(Castillo et al., 2012) or a gender inuence, is a rich area for future research.
When one considers these results in the context of workforce composition in the nance industry,
these are especially compelling results that could have important implications for team investment
decisions driven by the assessment of risk and return tradeos. The eects of team diversity
could have important economic consequences for rms in general and for the nance industry in
particular. Moreover, it is easy to see how Wall Street, with a largely male workforce, could be
driven to take higher risks than a workforce which is more reective of the general population. To
curb excessive risk taking and loss aversion, our ndings would suggest that understanding the role
of gender diversity in risk management would be useful in eecting change.
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Appendix
A Experimental Procedure: Subject Instructions
It is January 1, 2009. You are a portfolio management team working for a large asset management
company. Your team has been given the task of making independent selections for six separate
equity portfolios. You will be shown a series of six equity mutual funds and asked to choose between
two investment options for each mutual fund. Some decisions will require you to choose a stock
to purchase for the mutual fund. Other decisions will require you to choose a stock to sell for the
mutual fund. You will be given information on each stock portfolio (Stated fund strategy, sector,
fund size, historical performance etc.) and specic information on the investment options (P/E
ratios, historical average returns, etc.). Information on investment options will be based upon
historical information from actual companies. Future returns for each investment option have been
extrapolated. All of the information provided is not necessarily needed to make each decision.
Remember that each decision is independent. There can only be one team choice for each mutual
fund. For any decision, you will not be able to divide the amount to be invested between the two
options given. You will have an unlimited amount of time to make each decision. If at any time,
your team cannot reach a decision for one of the six portfolios, one of your team members will be
chosen at random to make that particular portfolio decision for your team.
After all team decisions have been made, your performance for each decision will be based upon
the stock returns (as of January 1, 2010) of your selections. Your team payment will be based upon
the performance of one of your team's decisions chosen at random from all of your team's decisions
in the experiment. If a buy decision is selected, each person will be paid $10 plus an additional $2
for each 1% return earned by the decision. If a sell decision is selected, each person will be paid $15
plus an additional $2 for each 1% net return earned by the decision. Net return will be calculated
as the return earned by the stock that is retained minus the return loss on the stock that is sold.17
(e.g. If your team decision number 3 is randomly chosen for pay-out purposes and your team's
selection for decision number 3 had a 10% net return, then you would be paid $30.) In order to
be eligible for a pay-out, each team must submit a decision for all six portfolios and every team
member must ll out a preliminary survey and an exit survey.
Please ask any questions before the start of the experiment. After the experiment has started, no
questions about the content of the experiment can be answered.
17The buy and sell payos are calculated dierently because the sell decisions could generate a net loss and the
experimental format dictates that we should have a minimum payout for each decision.
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B Econometric Analysis: Denition of Variables Used
Team Composition Variables
 All Male Team Dummy Variable - A dichotomous dependent variable that is given a value of
1 if the team is comprised of four males. The variable is 0 otherwise.
 Three Male Team Dummy Variable - A dichotomous dependent variable that is given a value
of 1 if the team is comprised of three males and one female. The variable is 0 otherwise.
 Two Male Team Dummy Variable - A dichotomous dependent variable that is given a value
of 1 if the team is comprised of two males and two females. The variable is 0 otherwise.
 One Male Team Dummy Variable - A dichotomous dependent variable that is given a value
of 1 if the team is comprised of one male and three females. The variable is 0 otherwise.
 All Female Team Dummy Variable - A dichotomous dependent variable that is given a value
of 1 if the team is comprised of four females. The variable is 0 otherwise.
 Two Ethnicities Represented Dummy Variable - A dichotomous dependent variable that is
given a value of 1 if the team has members that represent two dierent ethnicities. The
variable is 0 otherwise.
 Three Ethnicities Represented Dummy Variable - A dichotomous dependent variable that is
given a value of 1 if the team has members that represent three dierent ethnicities. The
variable is 0 otherwise.
 Total Number of Risk Averse Team Members - The total number of team members that are
classied as having a risk aversion disposition based upon the pre-experiment survey.
 Total Number of Loss Averse Team Members - The total number of team members that are
classied as having a loss aversion disposition based upon the pre-experiment survey.
Subject Characteristic Control Variables
 Age of Respondent - The age of the subject.
 Male Dummy Variable - A dummy variable that is given a value of 1 if the subject is male is
set to 0 otherwise.
 Body Mass Index - The English BMI measure calculated as subject weight in pounds
(subject height in inches)2 x 703.
 Number of Semesters Completed - The number of college semesters that the subject had
completed.
 Taken Finance Class Dummy Variable - A dummy variable that is given a value of 1 if the
subject had taken a nance class and is set to 0 otherwise.
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 African American Dummy Variable - A dummy variable that is given a value of 1 if the
subject was African American and is set to 0 otherwise.
 Southeast/East Asian Dummy Variable - A dummy variable that is given a value of 1 if the
subject was Asian and is set to 0 otherwise.
 South Asian Dummy Variable - A dummy variable that is given a value of 1 if the subject
was South Asian and is set to 0 otherwise.
 Hispanic Dummy Variable - A dummy variable that is given a value of 1 if the subject was
Hispanic and is set to 0 otherwise.
 Other Race Dummy Variable - A dummy variable that is given a value of 1 if the subject
reported being of a race other than White, African American, Hispanic, Asian, or South Asian
and is set to 0 otherwise.
 Leadership Dummy Variable - This variable is given a value of 1 if the student indicated
holding a leadership position either within the university or outside the university. The
variable is given a value of 0 if no leadership positions were reported.
 Risk Aversion Disposition Dummy Variable - A dummy variable that is given a value of 1 if
the subject prefers to be given a certain amount of $30 to playing a lottery with a 0.5 chance
of being given $0 and a 0.5 chance of being given $120. The variable is set to 0 if the subject
prefers the lottery.
 Loss Aversion Disposition Dummy Variable - A dummy variable that is given a value of 1 if
the subject prefers a lottery with a 0.5 chance of receiving $0 and a 0.5 chance of receiving
$120 to being given $120 and also being required to play a lottery with a 0.5 chance of having
to pay $0 and a 0.5 chance of having to pay $120. The variable is set to 0 otherwise.
Experiment Control Variables
 Decision Dummies - Dummy variables for the specic investment decision.
 Order of Decision - The order of the investment decision out of the six decisions.
 Investment Choice Industry Dummies - Dummy variables for the industries represented by
the investment choices.
 Treatment Dummies - Dummy variables representing the treatment for the decision.
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